Rewriting logic 40] is proposed as a logical framework in which other logics can be represented, and as a semantic framework for the speci cation of languages and systems. Using concepts from the theory of general logics 39], representations of an object logic L in a framework logic F are understood as mappings L ! F that translate one logic into the other in a conservative way. The ease with which such maps can be de ned is discussed in detail for the cases of linear logic, logics with quanti ers, and any sequent calculus presentation of a logic for a very general notion of \sequent." Using the fact that rewriting logic is re ective, it is often possible to reify inside rewriting logic itself a representation map L ! RWLogic for the nitely presentable theories of L. Such a rei cation takes the form of a map between the abstract data types representing the nitary theories of L and of RWLogic. Regarding the di erent but related use of rewriting logic as a semantic framework, the straightforward way in which very diverse models of concurrency can be expressed and uni ed within rewriting logic is illustrated with CCS. In addition, the way in which constraint solving ts within the rewriting logic framework is brie y explained.
Introduction
The relationships between logic and computation, and the mutual interactions between both elds, are becoming stronger and more pervasive than they have ever been. In fact, our way of thinking about both logic and computation is being altered quite strongly. For example, there is such an increasingly strong connection|in some cases to the point of complete identi cation| between computation and deduction, and such impressive progress in compilation techniques and computing power, that the frontiers between logical systems, theorem-provers, and declarative programming languages are shifting and becoming more and more tenuous, with each area in uencing and being in uenced by the others.
Similarly, in the speci cation of languages and systems there is an increasing shift from mathematically precise but somewhat restricted formalisms towards speci cations that are not only mathematical, but actually logical in nature, as exempli ed, for example, by speci cation formalisms such as algebraic speci cations and structural operational semantics. In this way, languages and systems that in principle may not seem to bear any resemblance to logical systems and may be completely \conventional" in nature, end up being conceptualized primarily as formal systems.
However, any important development brings with it new challenges and questions. Two such questions, that we wish to address in this paper are:
How can the proliferation of logics be handled? Can exible logics allowing the speci cation and prototyping of a wide variety of languages and systems with naturalness and ease be found? Much fruitful research has already been done with the aim of providing adequate answers to these questions. Our aim here is to contribute in some measure to their ongoing discussion by suggesting that rewriting logic 40] seems to have particularly good properties recommending its use as both a logical framework in which many other logics can be represented, and as a general semantic framework in which many languages and systems can be naturally speci ed and prototyped.
In our view, the main need in handling the proliferation of logics is primarily conceptual. What is most needed is a metatheory of logics helping us to better understand and explore the boundaries of the \space" of all logics, present and future, and to relate in precise and general ways many of the logics that we know or wish to develop.
Following ideas that go back to the original work of Goguen and Burstall on institutions 19], we nd very useful understanding the space of all logics as a category, with appropriate translations between logics as the arrows or morphisms between them. The theory of general logics 39] that we present in summary form in Section 2 expands the primarily model-theoretic viewpoint provided by institutions to give an adequate treatment of proof-theoretic aspects such as entailment and proof structures, and suggests not just one space or category of logics, but several, depending on the proof-theoretic or model-2 theoretic aspects that we wish to focus on. In our view, the quest for a logical framework, understood as a logic in which many other logics can be represented, is important but is not the primary issue. Viewed from the perspective of a general space of logics, such a quest can in principle|although perhaps not in all approaches|be understood as the search within such a space for a logic F such that many other logics L can be represented in F by means of mappings L ?! F that have particularly nice properties such as being conservative translations.
Considered in this way, and assuming a very general axiomatic notion of logic and ambitious enough requirements for a framework, there is in principle no guarantee that such an F will necessarily be found. However, somewhat more restricted successes such as nding an F in which all the logics of \prac-tical interest," having nitary presentations of their syntax and their rules, can be represented can be very valuable and can provide a great economy of e ort. This is because, if an implementation for such a framework logic exists, it becomes possible to implement through it all the other \object logics" that can be adequately represented in the framework logic.
Much work has already been done in this area, including the Edinburgh logical framework LF 25, 26, 17] and meta-theorem-provers such as Isabelle 51] , Prolog 49, 16] , and Elf 52] , all of which adopt as framework logics di erent variants of higher-order logics or type theories. There has also been important work on what Basin and Constable 3] call metalogical frameworks. These are frameworks supporting reasoning about the metalogical aspects of the logics being represented. Typically, this is accomplished by reifying as \data" the proof theory of the logic being represented in a process that is described in 3] as externalizing the logic in question. This is in contrast to the more internalized form in which logics are represented in LF and in meta-theorem-provers, so that deduction in the object logic is mirrored by deduction|for example, type inference|in the framework logic. Work on metalogical frameworks includes the already mentioned paper by Basin and Constable 3] , who advocate constructive type theory as the framework logic, work of Matthews, Smaill and Basin 38] , who use Feferman's FS 0 15 ], a logic designed with the explicit purpose of being a metalogical framework, earlier work by Smullyan 56] , and work by Goguen, Stevens, Hobley and Hilberdink 23] on the 2OBJ meta-theorem-prover, which uses order-sorted equational logic 22, 24] .
A di culty with systems based on higher-order type theory such as LF is that it may be quite awkward and of little practical use to represent logics whose structural properties di er considerably from those of the type theory. For example, linear and relevance logics do not have adequate representations in LF, in a precise technical sense of \adequate" 17, Corollary 5.1.8]. Since in metalogical frameworks a direct connection between deduction in the object and framework logics does not have to be maintained, they seem in principle much more exible in their representational capabilities. However, this comes at a price, since the possibility of directly using an implementation of the framework logic to implement an object logic is compromised.
In relation to this previous work, rewriting logic seems to have great exibility to represent in a natural way many other logics, widely di erent in nature, including equational, Horn, and linear logics, and any sequent calculus presentation of a logic under extremely general assumptions about such a logic. Moreover, quanti ers can also be treated without problems. More experience in representing other logics is certainly needed, but we are encouraged by the naturalness and directness|often preserving the original syntax and rules|with which the logics that we have studied can be represented. This is due to the great simplicity and generality of rewriting logic, since in it all syntax and structural axioms are user-de nable, so that the abstract syntax of an object logic can be represented as an algebraic data type, and is also due to the existence of only a few general \meta" rules of deduction relative to the rewrite rules given by a speci cation, where such a speci cation can be used to describe with rewrite rules the rules of deduction of the object logic in question. In addition, the direct correspondence between proofs in object logics and proofs in the framework logic can often be maintained in a conservative way by means of maps of logics, so that an implementation of rewriting logic can directly support an implementation of an object logic. Furthermore, given the directness with which logics can be represented, the task of proving conservativity is in many cases straightforward. Finally, although we do not discuss this aspect, externalization of logics to support metalogical reasoning is also possible in rewriting logic 37].
Another important di erence is that most approaches to logical frameworks are proof-theoretic in nature, and thus they do not address the model theories of the logics being represented. By contrast, several of the representations into rewriting logic that we have studied|such as those for equational logic, Horn logic, and linear logic|involve both models and proofs and are therefore considerably more informative than purely proof-theoretic representations.
As we have already mentioned, the distinction between a logical system and a language or a model of computation is more and more in the eyes of the beholder, although of course e ciency considerations and the practical uses intended may indeed strongly in uence the design choices. Therefore, even though at the most basic mathematical level there may be little distinction between the general way in which a logic, a programming language, a system, or a model of computation are represented in rewriting logic, the criteria and case studies to be used in order to judge the merits of rewriting logic as a semantic framework are di erent from those relevant for its use as a logical framework.
One important consideration is that, from a computational point of view, rewriting logic deduction is intrinsically concurrent. In fact, it was the search for a general concurrency model that would help unify the somewhat bewildering heterogeneity of existing models that provided the original impetus for the rst investigations on rewriting logic 40]. The generality and naturalness with which many concurrency models can be expressed in rewriting logic has already been illustrated at length in several papers 40, 42] . In this paper, we just discuss in some detail the case of Milner's CCS 48].
Deduction with constraints can greatly increase the e ciency of theorem provers and logic programming languages. The most classical constraint solving algorithm is syntactic uni cation, which corresponds to solving equations in a free algebra, the so-called Herbrand model, and is used in resolution. However, much more e cient deduction techniques than those a orded by resolution can be obtained by building in additional knowledge of special theories in the form of constraint solving algorithms such as, for example, semantic uni cation, or equalities and inequalities in a numerical domain. In the past few years many authors have become aware that many constraint solving algorithms can be speci ed declaratively using rewrite rules. However, since constraint solving is usually nondeterministic, the usual equational logic interpretation of rewrite rules is clearly inadequate as a mathematical semantics. By contrast, rewriting logic completely avoids such inadequacies and can serve as a semantic framework for logical systems and languages using constraints, including parallel ones.
The paper begins with a summary of the theory of general logics 39] that provides the conceptual basis for our discussion of logical frameworks. Then the rules of deduction of rewriting logic are introduced, and the Maude language based on rewriting logic is brie y discussed. This is followed by three sections illustrating the representation of logics in the rewriting logic framework: linear logic, quanti ers and sequent systems. Using the fact that rewriting logic is re ective 9,10], it is often possible to reify inside rewriting logic itself a representation map L ! RWLogic for the nitely presentable theories of L. Such a rei cation takes the form of a map between the abstract data types representing the nitary theories of L and of RWLogic, as we illustrate with the linear logic example. The use of rewriting logic as a semantic framework is illustrated by means of the CCS and constraint solving examples. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
General logics
A modular and general axiomatic theory of logics should adequately cover all the key ingredients of a logic. These include: a syntax, a notion of entailment of a sentence from a set of axioms, a notion of model, and a notion of satisfaction of a sentence by a model. The theory of general logics 39] provides axiomatic notions formalizing the di erent aspects of a logic and of their combinations into fuller notions of logic:
An entailment system axiomatizes the consequence relation of a logic. The notion of institution 19, 20] covers the model-theoretic aspects of a logic, focusing on the notion of satisfaction. A logic is obtained by combining an entailment system and an institution. A proof calculus enriches an entailment system with an actual proof theory. A logical system is a logic with a choice of a proof calculus for it. 5
Here we give a brief review of the required notions; a detailed account with many examples can be found in 39] (see also 36, 37] ).
Syntax can typically be given by a signature providing a grammar on which to build sentences. We assume that for each logic there is a category Sign of possible signatures for it, and a functor sen assigning to each signature the set sen( ) of all its sentences. For a given signature in Sign, entailment (also called provability) of a sentence ' 2 sen( ) from a set of axioms ? sen( ) is a relation ?`' which holds if and only if we can prove ' from the axioms ? using the rules of the logic. This relation must be re exive, monotonic, transitive, and must preserve translations between signatures. These components constitute an entailment system.
A theory in a given entailment system is a pair ( ; ?) with a signature and ? sen( ).
An institution consists of a category Sign of signatures and a functor sen : Sign ! Set associating to each signature a set of sentences, together with a functor Mod that associates to each signature a category of -models, and a binary relation j = between models and sentences called satisfaction satisfying appropriate requirements.
Combining an entailment system and an institution we obtain a logic, de ned as a 5-tuple L = (Sign; sen; Mod;`; j =) such that:
(Sign; sen;`) is an entailment system, (Sign; sen; Mod; j =) is an institution, and the following soundness condition is satis ed: for any 2 jSignj, ? sen( ), and ' 2 sen( ), ?`' =) ? j = '; where, by de nition, the relation ? j = ' holds if and only if M j = ' holds for any model M that satis es all the sentences in ?.
The detailed treatment in 39] includes also a exible axiomatic notion of a proof calculus|in which proofs of entailments, not just the entailments themselves, are rst class citizens|and the notion of a logical system that consists of a logic together with a choice of a proof calculus for it.
One of the most interesting fruits of the theory of general logics is that it gives us a method for relating logics in a general and systematic way, and to exploit such relations in many applications. The key notion is that of a mapping translating one logic into another L ?! L 0 that preserves whatever logical properties are relevant, such as provability of formulas, or satisfaction of a formula by a model. Therefore, we have maps of entailment systems, institutions, logics, proof calculi, and logical systems. Such mappings allow us to relate in a rigorous way di erent logics, to combine di erent formalisms together, and to explore new logics for computational purposes. A detailed treatment of such maps is given in 39]; here we just give a brief sketch. 6
Basically, a map of entailment systems ( ; ) : E ?! E 0 maps the language of E to that of E 0 in a way that respects the entailment relation. This means that signatures of E are functorially mapped by to signatures of E 0 , and that sentences of E are mapped by to sentences of E 0 in a way that is coherent with the mapping of their corresponding signatures. In addition, must respect the entailment relations`of E and`0 of E 0 , i.e., we must have ?`' ) (?)`0 ('):
The map is conservative when this implication is an equivalence. A map of logics has now a very simple de nition. It consists of a pair of maps: one for the underlying entailment systems, and another for the underlying institutions, such that both maps agree on how they translate signatures and sentences. There are also notions of map of proof calculi and map of logical systems, for which we refer the reader to 39].
As we have already explained in the introduction, viewed from the perspective of a general space of logics that can be related to each other by means of mappings, the quest for a logical framework can be understood as the search within such a space for a logic F (the framework logic) such that many other logics (the object logics) such as, say, L can be represented in F by means of mappings L ?! F that have good enough properties. The minimum requirement that seems reasonable to make on a representation map L ?! F is that it should be a conservative map of entailment systems. Under such circumstances, we can reduce issues of provability in L to issues of provability in F, by mapping the theories and sentences of L into F using the conservative representation map. Given a computer implementation of deduction in F, we can use the conservative map to prove theorems in L by proving the corresponding translations in F. In this way, the implementation for F can be used as a generic theorem-prover for many logics.
However, since maps between logics can, as we have seen, respect additional logical structure such as the model theory or the proofs, in some cases a representation map into a logical framework may be particularly informative because, in addition to being a conservative map of entailment systems, it is also a map of institutions, or a map of proof calculi. For example, when rewriting logic is chosen as a logical framework, appropriate representation maps for equational logic, Horn logic, and propositional linear logic can be 7
shown to be maps of institutions also 36]. In general, however, since the model theories of di erent logics can be very di erent from each other, it is not reasonable to expect or require that the representation maps into a logical framework will always be maps of institutions. Nevertheless, what it can always be done is to \borrow" the additional logical structure that F may have (institution, proof calculus) to endow L with such a structure, so that the representation map does indeed preserve the extra structure 7].
Having criteria for the adequacy of maps representating logics in a logical framework is not enough. An equally important issue is having criteria for the generality of a logical framework, so that it is in fact justi ed to call it by that name. That is, given a candidate logical framework F, how many logics can be adequately represented in F? We can make this question precise by de ning the scope of a logical framework F as the class of entailment systems E having conservative maps of entailment systems E ?! F. In this regard, the axioms of the theory of general logics that we have presented are probably too general; without adding further assumptions it is not reasonable to expect that we can nd a logical framework F whose scope is the class of all entailment systems. A much more reasonable goal is nding an F whose scope includes all entailment systems of \practical interest," having nitary presentations of their syntax and their rules of deduction. Axiomatizing such nitely presentable entailment systems and proof calculi so as to capture|in the spirit of the more general axioms that we have presented, but with stronger requirements|all logics of \practical interest" (at least for computational purposes) is a very important research task.
Another important property that can help measuring the suitability of a logic F as a logical framework is its representational adequacy, understood as the naturalness and ease with which entailment systems can be represented, so that the representation E ?! F mirrors E as closely as possible. That is, a framework requiring very complicated encodings for many object logics of interest is less representationally adequate than one for which most logics can be represented in a straightforward way, so that there is in fact little or no \distance" between an object logic and its corresponding representation. Although at present we lack a precise de nition of this property, it is quite easy to observe its absence in particular examples. We view representational adequacy as a very important practical criterion for judging the relative merits of di erent logical frameworks.
In this paper, we present rewriting logic as a logic that seems to have particularly good properties as a logical framework. The evidence we can give within the space constraints of this paper is necessarily partial; further evidence can be found in 36, 37] . We conjecture that the scope of rewriting logic contains all entailment systems of \practical interest" for a reasonable axiomatization of such systems.
3 Rewriting logic
A signature in rewriting logic is an equational theory ( ; E), where is an equational signature and E is a set of -equations 3 . Rewriting will operate on equivalence classes of terms modulo E. In this way, we free rewriting from the syntactic constraints of a term representation and gain a much greater exibility in deciding what counts as a data structure; for example, string rewriting is obtained by imposing an associativity axiom, and multiset rewriting by imposing associativity and commutativity. Of course, standard term rewriting is obtained as the particular case in which the set of equations E is empty.
Techniques for rewriting modulo equations have been studied extensively 14] and can be used to implement rewriting modulo many equational theories of interest. This increases considerably the expressive power of rewrite theories, of which later examples in this paper make use.
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Rewriting logic is a logic for reasoning correctly about concurrent systems having states, and evolving by means of transitions. The signature of a rewrite theory describes a particular structure for the states of a system|e.g., multiset, binary tree, etc.|so that its states can be distributed according to such a structure. The rewrite rules in the theory describe which elementary local transitions are possible in the distributed state by concurrent local transformations. The rules of rewriting logic allow us to reason correctly about which general concurrent transitions are possible in a system satisfying such a description. Thus, computationally, each rewriting step is a parallel local transition in a concurrent system.
Alternatively, however, we can adopt a logical viewpoint instead, and regard the rules of rewriting logic as metarules for correct deduction in a logical system. Logically, each rewriting step is a logical entailment in a formal system. This second viewpoint is particularly fruitful when using rewriting logic as a logical framework 36,37].
Thus, in rewriting logic t] should not be understood as a term in the usual rst-order logic sense, but as a proposition or formula|built up using the connectives in |that asserts being in a certain state having a certain structure. However, unlike most other logics, the logical connectives and their structural properties E are entirely user-de nable. This provides great exibility for considering many di erent state structures and makes rewriting logic very general in its capacity to deal with many di erent types of concurrent systems, and also in its capacity to represent many di erent logics.
The computational and the logical viewpoints under which rewriting logic can be interpreted can be summarized in the following diagram of correspondences, which will be further illustrated by means of the examples described in later sections. State In what follows, we will use the syntax of Maude 41, 46, 8] , a wide spectrum programming language directly based on rewriting logic, to present rewrite theories. In Maude, there are essentially two kinds of modules: 5 Functional modules, which are of the form fmod E endfm for an equational theory E, and System modules, which are of the form mod R endm for a rewrite theory R.
In functional modules, equations are declared with the keywords eq or ceq (for conditional equations), and in system modules with the keywords ax or cax. Certain equations, such as associativity, commutativity, or identity, for which rewriting modulo is provided, can be declared together with the corresponding function using the keywords assoc, comm, id. Rules can only appear in system modules, and are declared with the keywords rl or crl.
The version of rewriting logic used for Maude in this paper is order-sorted 6 . This means that rewrite theories are typed (types are called sorts) and can have subtypes (subsorts), and that function symbols can be overloaded. In particular, functional modules are order-sorted equational theories 22] and they form a sublanguage similar to OBJ 24] . Logically, this corresponds to a map of logics OSEqtl ?! OSRWLogic embedding (order-sorted) equational logic within (order-sorted) rewriting logic. The details of this map of logics are discussed in 36, Section 4.1].
As in OBJ, Maude modules can be imported by other modules, and can also be parameterized by means of theories that specify semantic requirements for interfaces.
Since the power and the range of applications of a multiparadigm logic programming language can be substantially increased if it is possible to solve queries involving logical variables in the sense of relational programming, as in the Prolog language, we are naturally led to seek a uni cation of the three paradigms of functional, relational and concurrent object-oriented programming into a single multiparadigm logic programming language. This uni cation can be attained in a language extension of Maude called MaudeLog. The integration of Horn logic is achieved by a map of logics OSHorn ?! OSRWLogic that systematically relates order-sorted Horn logic to order-sorted rewriting logic. The details of this map are discussed in 36, Section 4.2].
Linear logic
In this section, we describe a map of logics LinLogic ?! OSRWLogic mapping theories in full quanti er-free rst-order linear logic to rewrite theories. We do not provide much motivation for linear logic, referring the reader to 18, 57, 35] for example. We need to point out, nonetheless, the way linear logic is seen as an entailment system. If one thinks of formulas as sentences and of the turnstile symbol \`" in a sequent as the entailment relation, then this relation is not monotonic, because in linear logic the structural rules of weakening and contraction are forbidden, so that, for example, we have the sequent A`A as an axiom, but we cannot derive either A; B`A or even A; AÀ . The point is that, for a linear logic signature, the elements of sen( ) should not be identi ed with formulas but with sequents. Viewed as a way of generating sequents, i.e., identifying our entailment relation`with the closure of the horizontal bar relation among linear logic sequents, the entailment of linear logic is indeed re exive, monotonic and transitive. This idea is also supported by the categorical models for linear logic 55, 35] , in which sequents are interpreted as morphisms, and leads to a very natural correspondence between the models of rewriting and linear logic. We use the syntax of the Maude language to write down the map of entailment systems from linear logic to rewriting logic. Note that any sequence of characters starting with either \---" or \***" and ending with \end-of-line" is a comment. Also, from now on, we usually drop the equivalence class square brackets, adopting the convention that a term t denotes the equivalence class t] E for the appropriate set of structural axioms E.
We rst de ne the functional theory PROP0 X] which introduces the syntax of propositions as a parameterized abstract data type. The parameterization permits having additional structure at the level of atoms if desired. In order to provide a proper treatment of negation, only equations are given, and no rewrite rules are introduced in this theory; they are introduced afterwards in the LINLOG X] theory. The purpose of the equations in the PROP0 X] theory is to push negation to the atom level, by using the dualities of linear logic; this is a well-known process in classical and linear logic. Some presentations of linear logic are given in the form of one-sided sequents`? where negation has been pushed to the atom level, and there are no rules for negation in the sequent calculus 18]. In this section, in order to make the connections with category theory and with rewriting logic more direct, we prefer to use standard sequents of the more general form ?` . In Section 6, we will also use one-sided sequents just in order to reduce the number of rules.
The style of our formulation adopts a categorical viewpoint for the proof theory and semantics of linear logic 55, 35] ). This style exploits the close connection between the models of linear logic and those of rewriting logic which are also categories, as we have mentioned in Section 3. When seeking the minimal categorical structure required for interpreting linear logic, an important question is how to interpret the connective P without using negation, and how to axiomatize its relationship with the tensor . Cockett and Seely have answered this question with the notion of a weakly distributive category 11]. A weakly distributive category consists of a category C with two symmetric tensor products ; P: C C ! C, and a natural transformation A (B P C) ?! (A B) P B (weak distributivity) satisfying some coherence equations 7 . Negation is added to a weakly distributive category by means of a function ( ) ? : jCj ! jCj on the objects of C, and natural transformations 1 ?! A P A ? and A A ? ?! ? satisfying some coherence equations.
In the following theory, the rewrite rules for ; P and negation correspond to the natural transformations in the de nition of a weakly distributive category, as explained above. The rules for & ( , respectively) mirror the usual de nition of nal object and product (initial object and coproduct, respectively). Finally, the axioms and rules for the exponential ! (?, respectively) correspond to a comonad with a comonoid structure (monad with monoid structure, respectively). Note that some rules are redundant, but we have decided to include them in order to make the connectives less interdependent, so that, for example, if the connective & is omitted we do not need to add new rules for the modality !. *** (6) rl !P => P . rl !P => !!P . rl !P => 1 . *** redundant from (1) and (6) above rl !P => !P !P . *** redundant from (2) and (5) is a LINLOG(T)-rewrite, i.e., it is provable in rewriting logic from the rewrite theory LINLOG(T). Thus, we have a map of entailment systems between linear logic and rewriting logic, which is conservative. Moreover, Section 4. 
Quanti ers
In Section 4 we have de ned a map of logics between quanti er-free linear logic and rewriting logic. In this section, we show a technique that can be used to extend that map at the level of entailment systems to quanti ers. Our equational treatment of quanti cation, inspired by ideas of Laneve and Montanari on the de nition of the lambda calculus as a theory in rewriting logic 33], is very general and encompasses not only existential and universal quanti cation, but also lambda abstraction and other such binding mechanisms.
The main idea is to internalize as operations in the theory the notions of free variables and substitution that are usually de ned at the metalevel. Then, the typical de nitions of such notions by structural induction on terms can be easily written down as equations in the theory, but, more importantly, we can consider terms modulo these axioms and we can also use the operation of substitution explicitly in the rules introducing or eliminating quanti ers. This is similar to the lambda calculus with explicit substitutions de ned by Abadi, Cardelli, Curien, and L evy in 1]. 16 We only present here the example of the lambda abstraction binding mechanism in the lambda calculus, as de ned by Laneve and Montanari in 33]. We assume a parameterized functional module SET X] that provides nite sets over a parameter set X with operations U for union, -for set di erence, f g for singleton, emptyset for the empty set, and a predicate is-in for membership. 
if not(X == Y) . eq (MN) P/X] = (M P/X])(N P/X]) . eq ( X.M) N/X] = X.M . ceq ( Y.M) N/X] = Y.(M N/X]) if not(X == Y) and (not(Y is-in fv(N)) or not(X is-in fv(M))) . ceq ( Y.M) N/X] = (new(fv(MN))).((M new(fv(MN))/Y]) N/X]) if not(X == Y) and Y is-in fv(N) and X is-in fv(M) . endfm
Note that substitution is here another term constructor instead of a metasyntactic operation. Of course, using the above equations, all occurrences of the substitution constructor can be eliminated. After having de ned in the previous functional module the class of lambda terms with substitution, we 17 just need to add the equational axiom of alpha conversion and the beta rule in the following module: 
Sequent systems
In Section 4, we have mapped linear logic formulas to terms, and linear logic sequents to rewrite rules in rewriting logic. There is another map of entailment systems between linear logic and rewriting logic in which linear sequents become also terms, and rewrite rules correspond to rules in a Gentzen sequent calculus for linear logic. In order to reduce the number of rules of this calculus, we consider one-sided linear sequents in this section, but a completely similar treatment can be given for two-sided sequents. Thus, a linear logic sequent will be a turnstile symbol \`" followed by a multiset M of linear logic formulas, that in our translation to rewriting logic will be represented by the term`M. Using the duality of linear logic negation, a two-sided sequent A on the sort Configuration. Recalling that \---" introduces a comment, this rule can be written as
In the module below, we assume a module FO It is very important to realize that the technique used in this conservative map of entailment systems is very general and it is in no way restricted to linear logic. Indeed, it can be applied to any sequent calculus, be it for intuitionistic, classical or any other logic. Moreover, it can even be applied to systems more general than traditional sequent calculi. Thus, a \sequent" can for example be a sequent presentation of natural deduction, a term assignment system, or even any predicate de ned by structural induction in some way such that the proof is a kind of tree, as for example the operational semantics of CCS given later in Section 8 and any other use of the so-called structural operational semantics (see 53, 27] ). The general idea is to map a rule in the \sequent" system to a rewrite rule over a \con guration" of sequents or predicates, in such a way that the rewriting relation corresponds to provability of such a predicate.
Re ection
We give here a brief summary of the notion of a universal theory in a logic and of a re ective entailment system introduced in 9]. These notions axiomatize re ective logics within the theory of general logics 39]. We focus here on the simplest case, namely entailment systems. However, re ection at the proof calculus level|where not only sentences, but also proofs are re ected|is also very useful; the adequate de nitions for that case are also in 9].
A re ective logic is a logic in which important aspects of its metatheory can be represented at the object level in a consistent way, so that the objectlevel representation correctly simulates the relevant metatheoretic aspects. Two obvious metatheoretic notions that can be so re ected are theories and the entailment relation`. This leads us to the notion of a universal theory.
However, universality may not be absolute, but only relative to a class C of representable theories. Typically, for a theory to be representable at the object level, it must have a nitary description in some way|say, being recursively enumerable|so that it can be represented as a piece of language.
Given an entailment system E and a set of theories C, a theory U is C- such that for each T 2 C; ' 2 sen(T), T`' () U`T`': If, in addition, U 2 C, then the entailment system E is called C-re ective.
Note that in a re ective entailment system, since U itself is representable, representation can be iterated, so that we immediately have a \re ective tower" T`' () U`T`' () U`U`T`' : : :
Clavel and Meseguer have shown in 9,10] that indeed rewriting logic is reective. That is, there is a rewrite theory U with a nite number of operations and rules that can simulate any other nitely presentable rewrite theory R in the following sense: given any two terms t; t 0 in R, there are corresponding terms hR; ti and hR; t 0 i in U such that we have R`t ?! t 0 () U`hR; ti ?! hR; t 0 i: Moreover, it is often possible to reify inside rewriting logic itself a representation map L ! OSRWLogic for the nitely presentable theories of L. Such a rei cation takes the form of a map between the abstract data types representing the nitary theories of L and of OSRWLogic. In this section we illustrate this powerful idea with the linear logic mapping de ned in Section 4.
We have de ned a linear theory T as a nite set C of propositional constants together with a nite set S of sequents of the form A 1 ; : : : ; A nB 1 ; : : : ; B m , where each A i and B j is a linear logic formula built from the constants in C. Note that with this de nition, all linear theories are nitely presentable. First, we de ne an abstract data type LL-ADT to represent linear theories. A linear theory is represented as a term <C | G>, where C is a list of propositional constants (that is, identi ers), and G is a list of sequents written in the usual way. Moreover, all the propositional constants in G must be included in C. To enforce this condition, we use a sort constraint 44], which is introduced with the keyword sct and de nes a subsort LLTheory of a sort LLTheory? by means of the given condition. In the functional module below, we do not give the equations de ning the auxiliary functions const that extracts the constants of a list of sequents, and the list containment predicate =< . These functions are needed to write down the sort constraint for theories.
fmod LL-ADT is protecting QID . sorts Ids Formula Formulas Sequent . sorts Sequents LLTheory? LLTheory .
subsort Id < Formula . ops 1 0 ? > : -> Formula .
op _ _ : Formula Formula -> Formula . op _P_ : Formula Formula -> Formula . op _ _ : Formula Formula -> Formula . op _&_ : Formula Formula -> Formula . op !_ : Formula -> Formula . op ?_ : Formula -> Formula .
op _ ? : Formula -> Formula .
subsort Formula < Formulas . eq ... *** several equations defining the auxiliary operations *** "const" and "_=<_" used in the sort constraint condition eq ... endfm An order-sorted rewrite theory has much more structure, and therefore the corresponding RWL-ADT is more complex, but the basic ideas are completely similar as we sketch here. First we have an order-sorted signature, declaring sorts, subsorts, constants, operations and variables. Then, in addition, we have equations and rules. Thus, a nitely presentable rewrite theory is represented as a term <S | E | R>, where S is a term representing a signature, E is a list of equations, and R is a list of rules. In turn, the term S has the form <T ; B ; C ; O ; V> where each subterm corresponds to a component of a signature as mentioned before. In addition, several sort constraints are necessary to ensure for example that the variables used in equations and rules are included in the list of variables. Just to give the avor of the construction, here is a small fragment of the module RWL-ADT, where we have omitted most of the list constructors, operations to handle conditional equations and rules, and sort constraints. 
CCS
Milner's Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) 47, 48] is among the best well-known and studied concurrency models, and has become the paradigmatic example of an entire approach to \process algebras." We give a very brief introduction to CCS, referring the reader to Milner's book 48] for motivation and a comprehensive treatment; then, we give a formulation of CCS in rewriting logic and show its conservativity.
We assume a set A of names; the elements of the set A = fa j a 2 Ag are called co-names, and the members of the (disjoint) union L = A A are labels naming ordinary actions. The function a 7 ! a is extended to L by de ning a = a. There is a special action called silent action and denoted , intended to represent internal behaviour of a system, and in particular the synchronization of two processes by means of actions a and a. Then the set of actions is L f g. The set of processes is intuitively de ned as follows: 0 is an inactive process that does nothing.
If is an action and P is a process, :P is the process that performs and subsequently behaves as P. If P and Q are processes, P + Q is the process that may behave as either P or Q. If P and Q are processes, PjQ represents P and Q running concurrently with possible communication via synchronization of the pair of ordinary actions a and a.
If P is a process and f : L ! L is a relabelling function such that f(a) = f(a), P f] is the process that behaves as P but with the actions relabelled according to f, assuming f( ) = .
If P is a process and L L is a set of ordinary actions, PnL is the process that behaves as P but with the actions in L L prohibited. If P is a process, I is a process identi er, and I = def P is a de ning equation where P may recursively involve I, then I is a process that behaves as P.
This intuitive explanation can be made precise in terms of the following structural operational semantics that de nes a labelled transition system for CCS processes. Before de ning the operational semantics of CCS processes, we need an auxiliary module in order to build contexts in which process identi ers can be associated with processes, providing in this way recursive de nitions of processes. A sort constraint 44], which is introduced with the keyword sct and de nes a subsort Context by means of a condition, is used to enforce the requirement that the same process identi er cannot be associated with two di erent processes in a context. The semantics of CCS processes is usually de ned relative to a given context that provides de ning equations for all the necessary process identi ers 48, Section 2.4]. The previous module de nes the data type of all contexts. We now need to parameterize the module de ning the CCS semantics by the choice of a context. This is accomplished by means of the following theory that picks up a context in the sort Context. As in the case of linear logic, we have two possibilities in order to write the operational semantics for CCS by means of rewrite rules. On the one hand, we can interpret a transition P ?! P 0 as a rewrite, so that the above operational semantics rules become conditional rewrite rules. On the other hand, the transition P ?! P 0 can be seen as a term, forming part of a con guration, in such a way that the semantics rules correspond to rewrite rules, as a particular case of the general mapping of sequent systems into rewriting logic that we have presented in Section 6. Here we describe the rst possibility and refer the reader to 36, Section 5.3] for the second one. 
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*** Relabelling The net e ect of this restriction is that an ActProcess term of the form fA1g...fAkgP can only be rewritten into another term of the same form fA1g...fAkgfBgP', being P ?! fBgP' a CCS1 X,Y,C X,Y]]-rewrite. As another example, a process of the form A.B.P can be rewritten rst into fAgB.P and then into fAgfBgP, but cannot be rewritten into A.fBgP, because this last term is not well formed. After this discussion, it is easy to see that we have the following conservativity result. Note also that, since the operators + and | are declared commutative, one rule is enough for each one, instead of the two rules in the original presentation. On the other hand, we need three rules for relabelling, due to the representation of the relabelling function.
Constraint solving
Deduction can in many cases be made much more e cient by making use of constraints that can drastically reduce the search space, and for which 29 special purpose constraint solving algorithms can be much faster than the alternative of expressing everything in a unique deduction mechanism such as some form of resolution. Typically, constraints are symbolic expressions associated with a particular theory, and a constraint solving algorithm uses intimate knowledge about the truths of the theory in question to nd solutions for those expressions by transforming them into expressions in solved form. One of the simplest examples is provided by standard syntactic uni cation, the constraint solver for resolution in rst-order logic without equality and in particular for Prolog, where the constraints in question are equalities between terms in a free algebra, i.e., in the so-called Herbrand universe. There are however many other constraints and constraint solving algorithms that can be used to advantage in order to make the representation of problems more expressive and logical deduction more e cient. A remarkable property shared by most constraint-solving processes, and already implicit in the approach to syntactic uni cation problems proposed by Martelli and Montanari 34] , is that the process of solving constraints can be naturally understood as one of applying transformations to a set or multiset of constraints. Furthermore, many authors have realized that the most elegant and simple way to specify, prove correct, or even implement many constraint solving problems is by expressing those transformations as rewrite rules (see for example 21, 30, 12, 13] ). In particular, the survey by Jouannaud and Kirchner 30] makes this viewpoint the cornerstone of a uni ed conceptual approach to uni cation.
For example, the so-called decomposition transformation present in syntactic uni cation and in a number of other uni cation algorithms can be expressed by a rewrite rule of the form f(t1,...,tn) =?= f(t'1,...,t'n) => (t1 =?= t'1) ... (tn =?= t'n)
where in the righthand side multiset union has been expressed by juxtaposition.
Although the operational semantics of such rewrite rules is very obvious and intuitive, their logical or mathematical semantics has remained ambiguous. Although appeal is sometimes made to equational logic as the framework 30 in which such rules exist, the fact that many of these rules are nondeterministic, so that, except for a few exceptions such as syntactic uni cation, there is in general not a unique solution but rather a, sometimes in nite, set of solutions, makes an interpretation of the rewrite rules as equations highly implausible and potentially contradictory. We would like to suggest that rewriting logic provides a very natural framework in which to interpret rewrite rules of this nature and, more generally, deduction processes that are nondeterministic in nature and involve the exploration of an entire space of solutions. Since in rewriting logic rewrite rules go only in one direction and its models do not assume either the identi cation of the two sides of a rewrite step, or even the possible reversal of such a step, all the di culties involved in an equational interpretation disappear.
Such a proposed use of rewriting logic for constraint solving and constraint programming seems very much in the spirit of recent rewrite rule approaches to constrained deduction such as those of C. Kirchner, H. Kirchner, and M. Rusinovitch 31], Bachmair, Ganzinger, Lynch, and Snyder 2], and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio 50]. In particular, the ELAN language of C. Kirchner, H. Kirchner, and M. Vittek 32, 5] proposes an approach to the prototyping of constraint solving languages similar in some ways to the one that would be natural using a Maude interpreter.
Concluding remarks
Rewriting logic has been proposed as a logical framework that seems particularly promising for representing logics, and its use for this purpose has been illustrated in detail by a number of examples. The general way in which such representations are achieved is by:
Representing formulas or, more generally, proof-theoretic structures such as sequents, as terms in an order-sorted equational data type whose equations express structural axioms natural to the logic in question.
Representing the rules of deduction of a logic as rewrite rules that transform certain patterns of formulas into other patterns modulo the given structural axioms. Besides, the theory of general logics 39] has been used as both a method and a criterion of adequacy for de ning these representations as conservative maps of logics or of entailment systems. From this point of view, our tentative conclusion is that, at the level of entailment systems, rewriting logic should in fact be able to represent any nitely presented logic via a conservative map, for any reasonable notion of \ nitely presented logic." Making this tentative conclusion de nite will require proposing an intuitively reasonable formal version of such a notion in a way similar to previous proposals of this kind by Smullyan 56] and Feferman 15] .
In some cases, such as for equational logic, Horn logic with equality, and linear logic, we have in fact been able to represent logics in a much stronger sense, namely by conservative maps of logics that also map the models 36]. Of 31 course, such maps are much more informative, and may a ord easier proofs, for example for conservativity. However, one should not expect to nd representations of this kind for logics whose model theory is very di erent from that of rewriting logic. We have also shown how the fact that rewriting logic is re ective greatly enhances its capabilities as a logical framework, by allowing the metalevel representation maps L ?! RWLogic to be rei ed inside rewriting logic itself.
The uses of rewriting logic as a semantic framework for the speci cation of languages, systems, and models of computation have also been discussed and illustrated with examples. Such uses include the speci cation and prototyping of concurrent models of computation and concurrent object-oriented systems, of general programming languages, of automated deduction systems and logic programming languages that use constraints, and of logical representation of action and change in AI 36, 42] .
From a pragmatic point of view, the main goal of this study is to serve as a guide for the design and implementation of a theoretically-based high-level system in which it can be easy to de ne logics and to perform deductions in them, and in which a very wide variety of systems, languages, and models of computation can similarly be speci ed and prototyped. Having this goal in mind, the following features seem particularly useful:
Executability, which is not only very useful for prototyping purposes, but is in practice a must for debugging speci cations of any realistic size. User-de nable abstract syntax, which can be speci ed as an order-sorted equational data type with the desired structural axioms. Modularity and parameterization 9 , which can make speci cations very readable and reusable by decomposing them in small understandable pieces that are as general as possible. Simple and general logical semantics, which can naturally express both logical deductions and concurrent computations. These features are supported by the Maude interpreter 8]. A very important additional feature that the Maude interpreter has is good support for exible and expressive strategies of evaluation 8, 10] , so that the user can explore the space of rewritings in intelligent ways.
